This group is assuredly motivated to see value accrue to the PRIME token, and supports DAO initiatives, product and protocol launches that provide this function. However, this group may not care about actively governing Prime — so they don’t necessarily need voting rights. Voting rights in Prime are referred to as Reputation (REP) — a non-transferable right that can be taken away by the DAO. Many DeFi projects have made the mistake of being entirely governed by their token holders, which leads to high rates of voter apathy and a plutocratic accumulation of voting rights — a centralizing force that must be avoided to maintain the political decentralization of Prime. This being said, the inverse is also true: in DAOs where Reputation holders possess all of the authority, the token holder ecosystem is apathetic and unsupportive. Sunny moods quickly change when token holders believe they’ve been treated unfairly — supporters can quickly morph into FUD producers. To mitigate this, mechanisms must be implemented that offer an opportunity for their active engagement. With this in mind, PRIME token holders should have the option to govern. To this end, there will be a mechanism for PRIME where token holders can lock PRIME to generate REP (more on this later!).
REP holders — the DAO’s voter assembly — provide the service of good governance to the DAO. Prime’s current governors are made up of experts with proven experience in DeFi and DAOs. For a recap of their composition, check out this blog post. The main motivation of the ecosystem governors is to see Prime’s values and objectives be achieved: that is, the realization of safe, ubiquitous, and sustainable open finance. But what ensures that they will practice good governance aligned with PRIME holders? The answer here is for the governors to also receive a small PRIME stipend, so that they are directly impacted by the value that they help create.
Unlike a centralized team, Prime will need a builder ecosystem where active builders and squads feel like co-owners in the collective. It’s expected that funds raised in the IDO will be heavily allocated to this formative collective, as they are the primary value creators. Yet, treating builders like service providers isn’t enough to be aligned with the other two stakeholder groups — co-ownership requires more. To this end, a contributor reward budget of PRIME has been established. In addition to imbuing feelings of co-ownership, the contributor rewards budget will doubly serve as a carrot to attract the strongest talent in the DeFi ecosystem.